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By David M. Uhlmann
Editor’s Note: This article is an expanded version  
of Professor Uhlmann’s op-ed, “Prosecuting Crimes  
Against the Earth” (New York Times, June 4, 2010).
The explosion that rocked the Deepwater Horizon oil rig on April 20, 2010, killed 11 
workers and triggered the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history. After six weeks of 
failed efforts to stop the gushing oil and protect the fragile ecosystem of the Gulf of 
Mexico and the communities along its shores, President Obama pledged on June 1 that 
“if our laws were broken . . . we will bring those responsible to justice.”  
President Obama’s words may have been political damage control; efforts to contain the 
spill could not have been going worse. Behind the scenes, however, federal prosecutors 
had been working since the first days of the spill to determine whether BP (the owner of 
the well), Transocean (the owner of the Deepwater Horizon rig), and Halliburton (the com-
pany that did the cementing job on the deep-ocean well) should be charged with crimes.
The Justice Department’s investigation is focusing on criminal charges under the Clean 
Water Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, two of the environmental crimes charged in 
the Exxon Valdez case. The Clean Water Act requires the government to show negligence, 
but the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is a strict liability offense that was committed as soon 
as oil coated migratory birds. The Justice Department also is weighing charges under the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act, to highlight the oil spill’s effect on aquatic life and the role of offshore 
drilling, and may pursue charges under the Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute to address 
the worker deaths. Finally, if evidence develops that corporate officials misled the govern-
ment about the integrity of the well or the amount of oil spewing into the Gulf of Mexico, 
the Justice Department will bring obstruction of justice and false statement charges.
Some may question whether criminal prosecution is appropriate based on the Gulf 
tragedy. Soon after the spill began, Texas Governor Rick Perry called the explosion “an act 
of God.” Tea Party activist and U.S. Senate candidate Rand Paul argued that we should 
avoid the blame game in the Gulf because “accidents happen.” After President Obama 
convinced BP to establish a $20 billion escrow fund for victims of the spill—which could 
become a restitution fund if a criminal prosecution occurs—U.S. Representative Joe 
Barton called the agreement a “Chicago-style shakedown” and apologized to BP.
If the Gulf oil spill had resulted from an act of God, such as a hurricane or a lightning 
strike, it might be appropriate to seek only civil penalties. If the spill occurred due to an 
unavoidable accident—an unanticipated or unpreventable equipment failure—we might 
prefer that the government decline criminal charges. Criminal prosecution should be 
reserved for cases where there is evidence of wrongdoing, which is why prosecutors 
avoid strict liability charges like the Migratory Bird Treaty Act except in cases of 
negligence. Fairness demands that we resist opportunistic criminal prosecutions: We 
should not prosecute criminally simply because a tragedy has occurred, even one as awful 
as the Gulf oil spill.
It appears nearly certain, however, that there was negligence and perhaps worse in the 
events leading to the Gulf oil spill. Congressional hearings and news reports have 




















identified numerous warning signs that went 
unheeded and deviations from standard indus-
try practice that occurred before the explosion 
on Deepwater Horizon. Gas was seeping into 
the well. The blowout preventer was leaking. 
Concerns were raised about the well casing. 
There were signs of trouble with the cement in 
the well. Less than one-third of the necessary 
stabilizing rods were used. Mud circulation 
was limited. A final concrete plug was not in-
stalled properly. And when disaster struck, the 
blowout preventer failed.
Prosecutors must examine all witness state-
ments, internal documents, and any physical 
evidence that remains after the explosion. Their decisions must be 
based on the sufficiency of the evidence to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which is a more demanding standard than applies 
to Congress and the media. But if the negligence claims prove ac-
curate, the Justice Department should bring criminal charges 
against BP, and possibly Transocean and Halliburton, and the fines 
should be in the billions of dollars, far more than the criminal fine of 
$125 million paid by Exxon for the 1989 Valdez oil spill (until now the 
largest for environmental crime).
The more difficult question for the Justice Department will be 
whether there is sufficient evidence to charge felonies, which the 
public will expect. All of the environmental laws that may have been 
broken in the Gulf oil spill provide for criminal penalties, but only the 
Clean Water Act includes felony charges. For the government to 
prove a felony violation of the Clean Water Act, it must prove the 
defendant acted knowingly, which means the defendant must have 
known at the time of the illegal act that a pollutant would be 
discharged into protected waters. A knowing violation may be easy 
to prove when a business intentionally dumps waste into a river, but 
it is much harder in the case of an oil spill.
No one thinks BP, Transocean, or Halliburton intended to spill oil into 
the Gulf. The government may argue, however, that the companies 
deviated so much from standard industry practice that they knew a 
blowout could happen. Or the government could argue that, even if 
the initial discharge involved only negligence (a misdemeanor under 
the Clean Water Act), each additional day of discharge represented 
a knowing violation. The first approach would track more closely our 
traditional understanding of knowledge requirements but might be 
difficult to sustain factually, particularly since the Minerals 
Management Service approved many of BP’s decisions. The second 
approach might be easier to prove—BP and the other companies 
have known since the early days of the spill that more oil would be 
discharged with each passing day—but would be a tenuous legal 
theory, since it would decouple knowledge from the act (the blowout) 
that caused the discharges to occur.
Another difficult question for the Justice Department will be wheth-
er individuals should be charged based on the Gulf oil spill, leading 
to jail time, which might inspire more careful drilling in the future. 
Prosecutors prefer to charge individuals in corporate cases because 
the deterrent value of a prosecution is greatest when corporate officials 
face incarceration. Absent false statements or 
obstruction of justice, however, the Justice De-
partment may struggle to identify culpable indi-
viduals with sufficient management authority in 
the Gulf oil spill case. Only those directly in-
volved in misconduct can be charged with 
crimes, and it is likely that executives of BP, 
Transocean, and Halliburton played no such per-
sonal role in the disaster. Stated differently, it 
may be difficult to identify individuals with 
enough supervisory responsibility and personal 
involvement to be blamed for the Gulf tragedy, 
particularly if the most culpable decisions were 
made by relatively low-level officials stationed 
on the drilling rig.
Whether to charge BP, however, will not be a tough issue. BP has a 
history of criminal violations, offering evidence of a culture that puts 
profits before the environment and worker safety. After a 2005 
explosion at its Texas City refinery, which killed 15 workers, BP 
pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Air Act by failing to maintain a 
safe facility. It also pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Water Act 
by having corroded pipelines that caused oil spills in Alaska’s 
Prudhoe Bay in 2006. BP will argue that those convictions involved 
different BP subsidiaries, but they raise questions about the 
effectiveness of its commitment to safe drilling.
Nor will it be difficult for the Justice Department to conclude that 
the Gulf oil spill warrants both criminal and civil enforcement. In 
most cases, the government chooses between criminal and civil 
penalties depending upon the seriousness of the violation, the 
complexity of the underlying law, and the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Electing remedies promotes principles of fairness (a 
defendant generally should not face criminal and civil sanctions for 
the same conduct) and serves the public interest in deterring 
violations (the government can address more violations if it does not 
dedicate criminal and civil personnel to the same case). But the 
Justice Department has a long-standing policy of seeking both 
criminal and civil penalties in the most egregious cases, and the Gulf 
oil spill easily meets that test.
The Justice Department can and should seek record criminal and 
civil penalties for the Gulf oil spill. The goal should not be to put BP 
and the other companies out of business; they need to remain viable 
to pay the claims against them, and we should not lose sight of the 
fact that their risky drilling occurred with our acquiescence, a high-
wire effort to quench our insatiable thirst for more oil. But the fines 
should hurt, disgorging an amount that approximates the aggregate 
costs to the ecosystem and the economy, in addition to the 
compensation that BP and the other companies involved pay to the 
government and the victims of their crimes for cleanup costs, natural 
resource damages, and economic losses.
Criminal prosecution cannot restore the Gulf or end the suffering of 
the people who live along its shores. But a criminal penalty would 
ensure just punishment—and criminal prosecution would send a 
clear message that an environmental disaster of this magnitude 
cannot be allowed to happen again.
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